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ARGUMENT 
I. The Court of AppealsJ "Apparent Title " Ruling Fails to Address the 
Issue of "Inquiry Notice " Presented in this Case 
The brief filed by Appellees [collectively, "Metro West"] makes it clear that 
Appellees still do not understand (or simply refuses to respond to) the County's principal 
argument in this case. That argument is simple: the record facts in this case establish that 
Metro West was on "inquiry notice" of an actual or potential defect in its grantors' title, and 
failed to undertake a reasonable investigation to ascertain the validity of the grantors' title. 
Metro West acknowledges that under the Recording Act, a "good faith" purchaser for value 
must be without "notice." But, without notice of what? Metro West focuses only on the 
issue of notice of a competing prior interest in the subject property. Thus, claims Metro 
West, it was without notice because there was no record evidence (at least in the Utah County 
recorder's office) of the County's interest in Parcel G. Metro West conveniently ignores the 
well-settled legal requirement of the "notice" doctrine which demands also that a purchaser 
must be without notice of a defect in his grantor's title. As discussed in detail below, it is 
undisputed in this case that Metro West accepted its grantor's quit claim deed with full 
knowledge that the grantor, the Tingeys, had no rightful claim of legal record title to the 
property. 
It is undisputed that there was absolutely no record title evidence supporting the 
Tingeys' representations to Metro West that they were the lawful owners of Parcel G. The 
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title records made it clear to all that there was no prior recorded conveyance of any kind to 
the Tingeys. Thus, the Tingeys' purported quitclaim deed conveyance to Metro was a classic 
"wild deed," (i.e., "a deed from a person not in the chain of title, and therefore without any 
force or effect as far as conveying any interest..." (Music Service Corp. v. Walton, 432 P.2d 
334, 336 (Utah 1967))), because the Tingeys were not in the chain of title to Parcel G. 
Further, there was absolutely no other evidence before the trial court supporting the 
Tingeys' claim of title (such as evidence of a claim by adverse possession). In this case, 
Metro West has been strangely silent as to the legal basis for its grantors' claim of title. All 
we really know is that Metro West curiously chose to accept the Tingeys's uncorroborated 
statements that "the Tingey family had owned, used and maintained Parcel G since the turn 
of the century" (Appellees Brief, p. 4, <p), without verification. 
Utah's Recording Act governing unrecorded instruments1 is a typical "race-notice" 
statutory recordation scheme, whereby a protected subsequent purchaser (i.e., "bona fide 
purchaser" or "BFP") must have taken his conveyance in good faith, for value, and without 
notice of two distinct matters: (a) the existence of a prior purchaser's competing claim of 
interest in the property; and/or (b) a defect in his grantor's title2. Throughout this case, both 
Metro West and the Court of Appeals have incorrectly focused solely on the first of these 
matters, i.e., whether Metro West had notice of a competing claim to the property by the 
^ T A H CODE ANN., Sec. 57-3-103. 
2
 Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Wasatch Bank of Pleasant Grove, 734 P.2d 
904, 906 [n. 2] (Utah 1986). See also, Pender v. Bird, 224 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Utah 1950). 
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County. 
But the analysis of the Court of Appeals is wrong-headed because it is the second of 
these matters, not the first, as to which Metro had notice. In this case, it is clear that Metro 
West had "inquiry notice" of an actual or potential defect in its grantors' title. Therefore, 
Metro West cannot be deemed a "good faith" or bona fide purchaser [BFP] as a matter of 
law. 
The Court of Appeals confused "record notice," the type of constructive notice that 
arises from public records, with "inquiry notice," a different form of constructive notice, 
which arises from facts and circumstances which would trigger further inquiry by a 
reasonable person. The County has never contended that inquiry notice arose in this case 
from public records. Rather, it arose from facts and circumstances confronted by Metro West 
before it purchased the property which would have excited the attention of a reasonably 
prudent purchaser to make further inquiry. 
For example, the statements allegedly made to Metro West by the Tingeys refusing 
to warrant their title, and delivering instead only a quit claim deed, should reasonably have 
placed a purchaser on notice that further inquiry regarding the integrity of the title was called 
for. The Tingeys' quitclaim deed to Metro West was nothing more than a wild deed, 
originating outside the record chain of title. This fact alone, to any reasonable, legitimate 
purchaser of real estate, would create genuine suspicion regarding the validity of the 
grantors' alleged title. 
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The record in this case establishes that Metro had more than enough reason to 
undertake an appropriate inquiry with respect to the Tingeys' claim of title, but failed to do 
so. Metro West reasonably ought to have looked beyond the Tingeys' bald, unsupported 
claims, and required greater evidence of those claims. In fact, the review of Utah County title 
records which Metro West's principals did make confirmed that there was no recorded legal 
interest in parcel G held by the Tingeys. Metro West failed to make any reasonable 
investigation concerning the factual and legal underpinnings of the Tingeys' claims, and took 
no reasonable steps to confirm the integrity of the estate it expected to receive from the 
Tingeys. 
II. Under Pender v. Bird, Metro West Cannot be a ''Good Faith" 
Purchasers as a Matter of Law Because it Knew its Grantors had 
Defective Title 
On the issue of Metro West's "good faith" as a subsequent purchaser of Parcel G, this 
court's decision in Pender v. Bird, 224 P. 2d 1057 (Utah 1950) controls. There, Pender's 
grantor, Hansen, advised Pender that he did not own the subject property. Pender 
nonetheless accepted a quitclaim deed from Hansen, paying $25. Pender then recorded the 
quitclaim deed before Bird recorded his tax deed, arguing in the ensuing quiet title action that 
he was protected as a subsequent good faith purchaser for value. The Utah Supreme Court, 
affirming the judgment below quieting title in Bird, held: 
" One who procures a quitclaim deed for a nominal sum after being advised 
that the grantor does not own the property, can neither assert in good faith that 
he purchaser the property without notice of any infirmity in the title, nor that 
he was a purchaser for value .... It is only when a purchaser parts with money 
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constituting the purchaser price in reliance on the title of his grantor, without 
notice of any infirmity in his grantor }s title, that the purchaser acts bona 
fides." 
Id., 224 P.2d at 1059 (emphasis added). Accord, Oakland Hills Dev. Corp, v. Lueders 
Drainage Dist, 537 N.W. 2d 258, 297 (Mich. App. 1995) (under recording act, "[a] good 
faith purchaser is one who purchases without notice of a defect in the vendor's title"). 
Here, Metro West does not dispute that it was fully aware that the Tingeys held no 
documented chain of title. Metro West has made no effort in this litigation to establish the 
integrity of the Tingeys5 title. Metro West merely asserts that it "relied" on the Tingeys' 
uncorroborated oral representations. Thus, following Pender, this court should hold as a 
matter of law that on these facts, Metro West knew of the infirmity in the record title it 
purportedly took from the Tingeys and was therefore not a "good faith" purchaser for 
purposes of the Act. 
The Court of Appeals' decision failed to address these crucial "inquiry notice" facts 
at all, effectively determining Metro's "good faith" as a matter of law on the mere basis that 
"[n]o statute or Utah case requires a party to conduct investigation beyond the county [title] 
records unless the party has knowledge of certain facts and circumstances requiring further 
inquiry." Op, ^ [13. Thus, while the Court of Appeals reiterated a hornbook formulation of 
the inquiry notice doctrine, it failed to address whether such notice arose in this case from 
the absence of any record title evidence supporting the Tingeys' oral assertions. 
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Metro West failed to take any steps, recognized as standard precautionary measures 
in modem real estate transactions, to determine the quality of the Tingeys' claira of title. For 
instance, Metro West did not require its grantor to warrant their conveyamce (instead 
accepting a quitclaim deed), did not cause a professional title search to be perfoimed, did not 
obtain title insurance, and did not seek legal counsel in purchasing Parcel G. These are all 
standard measures which real estate purchasers routinely take to secure an assurance of sound 
title. Instead, Metro West's principal, Paul Richards, relied solely on an informal review of 
Utah County records which he made with his partner (they allegedly "checked with the 
county"(Depo. Paul Richards [R. 216-217], 11. 21-5)). Thus, "checking with the county" 
constitutes the sum total of Metro West's efforts to verify the Tingeys' claims, and to secure 
its own purported title. Metro West did not bother to make any sort of competent, 
professional, industry-standard title examination to verify - or disprove - the Tingeys' 
claims. Metro West now simply asserts that its cursory title review found "no conflicts 
whatsoever with the Tingey family's representations" (Appellees' Brief, p. 20, fn. 3). 
However, the undisputed fact is that Utah County's records failed in any way to confirm the 
Tingeys' representations and, in fact, raised several "red flags" about those representations. 
It would be manifestly unjust to permit a claimant to secure title through a worthless 
deed or a straw man transaction with deliberate disregard to obvious title flaws, as against 
a competing claim based upon a valid but unrecorded conveyance, merely because he 
happened to be the first to record his deed. Such a result was never the intent of the 
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recording statutes, yet it is exactly the result that Metro West has obtained in this case. 
Through its affirmance of the summary judgment, the Court of Appeals creates a precedent 
under which fraudulent property transactions, based on the flimsiest evidence of "reasonable 
belief," are legally sanctioned. The Court's "apparent title" rule, and its application of that 
rule in this case, amount to bad public and legal policy. 
Ill Salt Lake County is at least entitled to remand for trial on the as yet 
unlitigated facts crucial to application of the newly declared 
"apparent title" rule. 
The Court of Appeals' decision establishes a novel doctrine of "apparent title"for 
protection of purchasers under the Recording Act, requiring that four elements be satisfied: 
(1) relevant property title records are silent as to ownership of the parcel; (2) claim of title 
by the purported owner; (3) possession of the land by the purported owner; (4) lack of visible 
activity, signs or fencing on the land by the true owner that might indicate a competing claim 
of title. Op., \\ 3. Yet in purporting to establish new substantive real property law, the Court 
of Appeals failed to remand this case to allow the parties to litigate their claims and defenses 
in light of the new four-part standard which the Court has posited. The unfair and absurd 
impact of the Court's decision is obvious: In effect, the Court has said, "We announce today 
the standards that should be applied in such a case, but we are not going to allow these 
parties to apply them." 
At a minimum, the case should be remanded for pre-trial proceedings consistent with 
the new law developed by the Court of Appeals. 
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IV. Metro West is not the Legal Owner of Parcel G Under Utah's Adverse 
Possession Law 
Metro West argues that even if the trial court erred in awarding title to it under the 
Recording Act, it nonetheless holds title by adverse possession. While neither the trial court 
nor the Court of Appeals addressed Metro West's adverse possession claim, Metro West now 
asks this court to do so, arguing that an appellate court may affirm on any proper ground, 
even though the trial court relied on some other ground (Appellees' Brief at 25). While this 
is correct, the "affirm on any ground" doctrine applies only where there are facts sufficient 
to support the alternative ground established in the record. See, e.g., Renn v. Utah Bd. of 
Pardons, 904 P2d 677,685 (Utah 1995); Limb v. Federated Milk Producers 'Ass fn, 461 p.2d 
290,293 n. 2 (1969). But such is not the case here. As shown below, Metro West has failed 
to establish facts sufficient to satisfy the elements of an adverse possession claim as a matter 
of law, and leaves for factual determination the question of whether the property was 
"dedicated [by the County] to a public use" thereby barring, at the threshold, any claim for 
adverse possession. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-13. 
(A) Metro West Has not Shown Facts in the Record 
Establishing the Statutory Elements of Adverse 
Possession 
Metro West has not established by undisputed facts that it meets the statutory 
requirements of adverse possession. Because Metro West cannot hold legal title to Parcel 
G through the recording act, a presumption exists under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7 that the 
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County holds legal title.3 There remain numerous issues of fact surrounding Metro West's 
claim of adverse possession which should be remanded for trial. The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that a strict burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he has met the 
requirements of adverse possession. Sec English v. Openshaw, 78 P. 476 (Utah 1904); Fares 
v. Urban, 151 P. 57 (Utah 1915); Spring Creek Irrigation Co. v. Zollinger, 197 P. 737 (Utah 
1921). The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that, "because of the gravity of adverse 
possession claims— wresting title from otherwise rightful owners—claimants must strictly 
comply with all requirements" Martin v. Kearl, 917 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(emphasis added). 
Metro West's reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-84 as its basis for an adverse 
3
 The Utah Code establishes the presumptions that exist in an adverse possession 
claim. It states: 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession 
thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be 
presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required 
by law; and the occupation of the property by any other person 
shall be deemed to have been under and in subordination to the 
legal title, unless it appears that the property has been held and 
possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years before the 
commencement of the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7 (1996)(emphasis added). 
4
 Section 78-12-8 of the Utah Code Ann. states, 
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, 
entered into possession of the property under claim of title, exclusive of other 
right, founding such claim upon a written instrument as being a conveyance of 
the property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, 
and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the property 
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possession claim does not automatically confer ownership upon it. In order to obtain title by 
adverse possession under a written document, Metro West must meet at least one of the 
requirements for such a claim to exist. Those requirements are found in Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-9, which provides, 
[F]or the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person claiming 
a title founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases: 
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. 
(3) Where, although not enclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel, or of 
fencing timber, for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for the 
ordinary use of the occupant. 
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the portion of 
such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not enclosed according 
to the usual course and custom of the adjoining county is deemed to have been 
occupied for the same length of time as the part improved and cultivated. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-9 (2001). In addition to these requirements, Metro West 
must also meet the basic requirements of an adverse possession claim. Those basic 
requirements have been codified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-12: 
In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the 
provisions of any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the 
land has been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years 
continuously, and that the party, his predecessors and grantors have 
included in such instrument, decree or judgment, or of some part of the 
property under such claim, for seven years, the property so included is deemed 
to have been held adversely, except that when the property so included consists 
of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one lot is not deemed a possession 
of any other lot of the same tract. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 (1996). 
Page 10 of 22 
paid all taxes which have been levied and assessment upon such land 
according to law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-12 (1996)(emphasis added). Additionally, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that in order for an adverse possession claim to prevail, the land 
possession must be open, notorious, and hostile. Mansfield v. Neff, 134 P. 1160,1165 
(Utah 1913). 
Applying these requirements to the case at bar, Metro West's adverse 
possession claim fails. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-9, Metro West must meet the 
mandates of at least one of four sections. Section (1) requires that the claimant show 
that he has usually cultivated or improved the entire property. Metro West claims to 
have usually improved the property by having bulldozed several roads to allow its soil 
sample machinery access to parts of the property. (R. 108-13,116-18,121-126). The 
County's memorandum in opposition to Metro West's motion for summary judgment 
directly disputed the sufficiency of the alleged improvements. (R. 186-188). The 
roads do not provide access to all areas of the property. As such, the roads are at most 
arguably an easement through the property, but an easement can only be claimed by 
prescription after 20 years of use. Johnson v. Higley, 989 P.2d 61, 68 (Ut. App. 
1999); Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 626 (Ut. App. 1993), cert, denied, Homer v. 
Sandy Hills, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). Metro West makes no claim of use or 
possession for twenty years here. 
The sufficiency of Metro West's alleged soil sample drilling, as 
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"improvement" or "cultivation" of the land, is also in dispute. There is no evidence 
to corroborate the frequency of or placement of the soil drillings. Nor did Metro West 
present any evidence to indicate that its soil sample testing and drilling were in 
accordance with the ordinary custom and usage of those in the gravel pit business. Cf., 
Day v. Steele, 184 P.2d 216, 219 (1947) (For land to be "usually improved," 
subsection (1) requires that the changes be of a substantial and permanent nature 
sufficient to apprize all as to ownership and such that it could not be mistaken for use 
of the occasional trespasser). Metro West's limited activity on Parcel G resembles 
more closely the holding of land for speculative possible future use, not a present 
actual use. In Pender v. Jackson, 260 P.2d 542, 543-44 (1953) the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the holding of the land for speculative future use does not satisfy the 
use requirement of the adverse possession statute. Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Appellant, this court should find that because of the existence 
of numerous questions of material fact, the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
was premature under section 78-12-9 (1). 
Metro West also cannot meet the "enclosure" requirements of section (2). 
There were never fences around the property or other type of enclosure that surrounds 
Parcel G. (R. 227). Metro West merely argues that the only access to such property 
was through their legitimately owned property. (Appellees' Brief at 5). Below, the 
County, in opposition to Metro West's motion for summary judgment, disputed 
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Metro West's claim that restricted access in anyway constitutes enclosure. (R. 184-
185). Metro West has never contended here that it otherwise enclosed Parcel G with 
fences, gates or other physical enclosures. As such Metro West's claim under section 
(2) cannot be sustained. 
Under section (3) Metro West did not show that the property was being used 
in the ordinary use of the occupant. The other types of use available under this 
section are not applicable because Metro West does not use the property for supply 
of fuel, fencing timber, husbandry, or pasturage. The ordinary use of the occupant has 
been defined by the Utah Supreme Court as, "appropriate to location and character of 
property." Day v. Steele, supra, 184 P.2d at 219 (Utah 1947). 
Metro West has not shown a specific time frame during which it excavated the 
property owned by Salt Lake County. Neither Metro West principals Paul Richards 
nor Roy McNeil were able to pinpoint a date after the April 1992 aerial photo when 
they entered the land. Their deposition testimony clearly contradicts their contentions 
of open, notorious, continuous possession for seven years. Richards testified that in 
1989, they possibly drilled three to five test holes, this process would take 
approximately one day for each hole. There were no permanent marks left from the 
holes. (R. 224-225). When asked to review the aerial photo taken in April of 1992, 
Richards could identify no permanent observable excavations evidencing the Metro 
West's possession of the subject property. (R. 225-226, 237,238). Metro West has 
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no records of days spent on the subject property, and Richards has no recollection of 
how many days the employees were on the subject property. (R. 226). Other than test 
holes and possible roads, no other uses were made of the property before actual 
mining. (R. 228). Richards does not know when he first started mining the subject 
property. (R. 229). He does not even know where the boundary line on the subject 
property is located. (R. 229, 231, 234). In fact, Richards testified that he is not 
claiming title to the subject property by adverse possession. (R. 230,231). He could 
not say with any specificity what time period he occupied the subject property. (R. 
232-233). 
Similarly, McNeil testified that the Metro West began exploring the soil on 
the subject property in 1998. (R. 243). He further testified that he did not dig any test 
holes on the subject property. (R. 244). McNeil testified that he did not know when 
the operations began on the subject property, but in 1990 to 1991 operations were on 
the opposite (south) side of the gravel pit, not on Parcel G. Id. McNeil also testified 
he does not know the location of the property line to the subject property. Id. He 
testified he did not know whether any exploration on the subject property occuired 
between 1990 and 1995. He stated that if some exploration had occurred on the Salt 
Lake County property during that period, he doesn't know if any test holes were done 
before 1998. (R. 244-245). Heagreedthatif any test holes were dug on the subject 
property before that, they each would have taken one day or less each. (R. 245). 
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McNeil testified that he didn't know if any roads were ever built on the subject 
property by Appellees, and he could not say with any certainty when or how many 
holes were dug on the subject property by the Appellees. 
Metro West has no claim under section (4), inasmuch as Parcel G is neither a 
known farm or part of a single lot. 
Appellees' Brief cited to Cooper v. Carter Oil Co., 316 P.2d 320 (Utah 1957) 
in support of the argument that the Metro West has met the requirements of adverse 
possession. In Cooper however, it was undisputed that the person that successfully 
adversely possessed the property, grazed sheep for three weeks a year during the 
statutory period he had also enclosed a portion of the property with a fence and had 
repaired and maintained the fence during that same seven year period. Metro West can 
show no such efforts here. It has not enclosed the property and can't show that Parcel 
G was used for at least three weeks a year during the seven years. 
(B) Metro West Has Not Produced Reliable Record 
Evidence of Payment of Taxes on Parcel G as 
Required for Adverse Possession 
Metro West also did not met its burden of establishing by clear and undisputed 
record evidence that it paid the requisite taxes on the property during the statutory 
period as mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-12. Absent such record evidence, 
Metro West cannot prevail as a matter of law in its adverse possession, regardless of 
whether it has satisfied the other elements of an adverse possession claim. 
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Metro West attempted to establish payment of such taxes by submitting to the 
trial court tax receipts issued by the Utah County Treasurer [R. 66 -75] which, on 
their face, do not even contain a consistent or complete property description for Parcel 
G until tax year 1997, or one year before the Appellee's received actual notice that 
they were wrongfully attempting to occupy the County's land5. In other words, it 
cannot be determined from the face of these tax receipts whether they in fact apply to 
Parcel G, or to some other parcel(s) possibly located in the same vicinity which Metro 
5 
For instance, the receipts for 1990, 1991, and 1992 [R. 66, 67, 68] refer under 
"property description" to a parcel containing "6.30 acres," while the 1993 receipt 
[R. 69] refers to two parcels (one of 21.30 acres, the other of 32.42 acres), 
apparently different parcels than those reflected in the previous receipt. Further 
there is no reference at all to Parcel G in the "property description" portions of 
these tax receipts until the 1997 receipt [R. 73]. The "property description" 
contained in the receipts changes almost from year to year, and appears to contain 
only esoteric property identification codes used by the Utah County treasurer, not a 
customary legal description through which Parcel G could be clearly identified as 
the subject of these tax receipts. Moreover, in the receipts for 1990, 1991, 1992, 
1997, 1998 and 1999, the "property description" section ends with a trailing 
notation such as "legal continues," or "more legal," apparently indicating that there 
was additional legal description not included on the face of those receipts. 
Finally, Metro West failed to produce any extrinsic evidence (such as an expert's 
affidavit) interpreting the Utah County treasurer's cryptic codes in the tax receipt 
"property description" section, or otherwise positively linking the tax receipts to 
Parcel G. Consequently, it cannot be determined from the face of these receipts 
whether the taxes paid were actually paid on Parcel G. These purported tax 
receipts are, at best, incomplete because they do not contain a clear identification 
of Parcel G as the property upon which the payment were made. Thus, they are 
facially insufficient as evidence of tax payment for adverse possession purposes. 
These inadequacies in the property descriptions contained in the tax receipts raise 
triable issues of material fact as to whether Metro West actually paid taxes on 
Parcel G, or whether the tax receipts actually pertain to other parcel(s) unrelated to 
this action. 
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West used in its sand and gravel operations. Thus, it would be plain error to sustain 
Metro West's adverse possession claim since their purported proof of tax payments 
are facially inadequate to establish payment of taxes with respect to this parcel 
Therefore, Metro West has failed to meet its burden of establishing - through credible 
and undisputed evidence - its payment of taxes. 
The County preserved its objection in the record to the sufficiency of Metro 
West's payment of taxes when, in the record of oral argument before Judge Peuler, 
counsel for the County argued: 
"... as I understand the record in this case, counsel is 
talking about this property known as Parcel G, but I'm 
not aware - if I misspeak, correct me counsel - of a 
survey provided by [Metro West] in this case saying, 
"This is the land we claim under the Tingey quit-claim 
deed, and this is how it borders Utah County and how it 
borders Salt lake County, and this is our fence around it, 
and this is the area that we have used and cultivated and 
paid taxes on" 
Trans. Oral Argument, January 2,2001, p. 22,1.8-16 [R. 309](emphasis added). The 
County further argued: 
".. .by way of example, if they're mining this property and 
it becomes part of their corporate assets and they sell it 
and make a profit, they pay taxes and they pay taxes on 
this mining, but as to other property taxes, I'm not sure 
the record is clear on this point." 
Id., p. 45,1.15-19 [R. 309](emphasis added). Counsel for Metro West then responded 
to the County's argument regarding lack of clarity in the record in identifying Parcel 
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G as the subject of the tax payments (id., p. 47,1. 10-19 [R. 309]). Hence, this issue 
was properly raised and preserved by the County, addressed by Metro West, and 
considered by the trial court. 
(C) There is a Genuine Issue of Fact as to Whether 
the County "Designated [Parcel G] for a Public 
Use," Thereby Barring any Claim by Adverse 
Possession under Sec. 78-12-13 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-1-13 bars any claim by adverse possession 
to property held by a governmental entity which has been "designated for public 
use."6 Metro West acknowledges (Appellees' Brief at 27-29) that the deposition 
testimony of Roger Hillam of the County's real estate division establishes that the 
County discussed "tentatively" in 1998 building a public park and bridge that would 
cross the Jordan River and run across Parcel G to connect to the Bonneville Shoreline 
Trail [R. 288-291]. The County has found no Utah cases requiring anything more 
The statute, in its entirety, provides as follows: 
"No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands 
held by any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated for 
public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or for any 
other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of time 
whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such town or city or county or 
the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of, and conveyed 
such real estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and that for more than 
seven years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser, his grantees or 
successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous and adverse 
possession of such real estate; in which case an adverse title may be acquired." 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-13 (Emphasis added). 
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than such "tentative" plans to qualify as a "designation for a public use" under Sec. 
78-12-13. The discussions referenced in the record by Mr. Hillam, however 
"tentative" or "preliminary," clearly evince an intent by the County to apply Parcel G 
to public use. 
As the Washington Court of Appeals held in City of Benton v. Adrian, et. al, 
50 Wash. App., 330 (1988), "... title by adverse possession, or an easement by 
prescription, cannot be acquired to property held by a municipal corporation for 
public purposes in its governmental capacity." Id., at 336. Similarly, this court has 
held that "... property held by municipalities ... cannot be acquired by adverse 
possession, at least insofar as the property is held for public use." Averett v. Utah Co. 
Drainage Dist., 763 P.2d 428, 429-30 (Ut. App.1988). In Averett, this court cited 
Commercial Waterway Dist. V. Permanente Cement Co, 61 Wash. 2d 509, 379 P.2d 
178, 181(1963) for the proposition that a "waterway held in trust for public use was 
not subject to adverse possession despite the fact that the subject property was not 
being used as a regular waterway, was outside a presently dredged channel, and there 
was no foreseeable plan to use it" Averett, at 430 (emphasis added). Thus, this 
court has protected government ownership of property against adverse possession 
claims even in the absence of a "foreseeable plan" to put the property to a public use. 
It is sound and sensible public policy to require only minimal evidence showing a 
"designation" or "holding" of property for a public use by a governmental entity as 
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against an adverse possession claimant because the law supports government's vital 
role as a holder of property in trust for the benefit of the public. Stated otherwise, it 
should not be an easy task for a private party to "wrest away" from government 
property which is held in trust for the public good. 
Should this court not find that the undisputed testimony of Mr. Hillam is 
sufficient as a matter of law to establish "designation for a public use" under Sec. 78-
12-13, at the very least, the record gives rise to a triable issue of fact as to whether 
Parcel G had been "designated for public use." If it had been, then Metro West's 
claim by adverse possession is barred at the threshold. 
For this additional reason, the trial court's ruling should not be affirmed based 
on Metro West's claim of adverse possession. As with other matters previously 
discussed, this claim is one filled with unresolved factual issues which should be 
remanded for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this court should hold as matter of law that Metro 
West was not a "good faith" purchaser of Parcel G for purposes of the Utah recording 
act because it took its purported title from the Tingeys with notice of infirmity in such 
title, thereby reversing the Court of Appeals, and remand for trial solely on the fact 
issues underlying Metro West's adverse possession claim. 
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In the alternative, this court should remand for trial both on the adverse 
possession claim, and on factual issues surrounding Metro West's status as good faith 
subsequent purchaser under the recording act. 
DATED this April 29, 2003. 
David E. Yocom 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
By: 
DonrfenSen 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant Salt Lake County 
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